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INTRODUCTION 
Despite having received sustained attention from both policymakers 
and academic commentators for the past several years, network neutrality 
shows no signs of retreating from the forefront of the policy debate. It 
has remained a central focus for Congress,1 the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC),2 and both presidential candidates during the last 
election.3 As President, Barack Obama has effectively ensured that 
network neutrality will remain at the top of the policy agenda by 
including provisions in the stimulus package requiring that the FCC 
* Professor of Law and Communication and Founding Director, Center for 
Technology, Innovation, and Competition, University of Pennsylvania. The author thanks the 
Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation for its financial support. 
 1. See The Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5353 Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 
(2008); Net Neutrality and Free Speech on the Internet: Hearing Before the Task Force on 
Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 2. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. 
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 FCC 
Rcd. 13,028 (2008); En Banc Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices Before the 
FCC (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/mt022508v.ram. 
 3. See Lee Gomes, Debugging Obama-McCain, FORBES, Oct. 13, 2008, at 72. 
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formulate a national broadband plan and through requiring that grants 
made by the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration comply with the network neutrality principles articulated 
by the FCC in 2005.4 
Although pinning down a precise definition of network neutrality 
has proven elusive,5 the most common position appears to be that 
network providers should route traffic without regard to the source or 
content of the packets, the application with which the packets are 
associated, or the sender’s willingness to pay. In the words of leading 
network neutrality proponent Lawrence Lessig, “Net neutrality means 
simply that all like Internet content must be treated alike and move at 
the same speed over the network.”6 
Some commentators have questioned whether this description of 
network neutrality represents an accurate description of the Internet’s 
past.7 Indeed, it would be surprising if any two similar packets would be 
treated exactly alike when traveling through a network consisting of more 
than thirty thousand autonomous systems that each determine their 
terms of interconnection through arms-length negotiations. There are, 
however, some systematic changes in the architecture of the Internet that 
have largely been overlooked by both commentators and policymakers. 
These changes are largely the result of network providers’ attempts to 
reduce cost, manage congestion, and maintain quality of service. 
 4. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 6001(j)–
(k), 123 Stat. 115, 515–16. 
 5. See Rachelle B. Chong, The 31 Flavors of Net Neutrality: A Policymaker’s View, 12 
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 147, 151–55 (2008) (identifying five distinct versions of network 
neutrality); Eli Noam, A Third Way for Net Neutrality, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/acf14410-3776-11db-bc01-0000779e2340.html (identifying seven 
distinct versions of network neutrality). 
 6. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. 
POST, June 8, 2006, at A23. 
 7. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, Portioning Bit by Bit: The Myth of 
Network Neutrality and the Threat to Internet Innovation, MILKEN INST. REV., 1st Qtr. 2007, 
at 28, 31–33; Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An 
Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
19, 36–37 (2009); Douglas A. Hass, Comment, The Never-Was-Neutral Net and Why Informed 
End Users Can End the Net Neutrality Debates, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 1576–77 
(2007); Kai Zhu, Note, Bringing Neutrality to Network Neutrality, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
615, 634–36 (2007); Michael Grebb, Neutral Net? Who Are You Kidding?, WIRED, May 31, 
2006, http://www.wired.com/news/technology/internet/0,71012-0.html; ANDREA RENDA, I 
OWN THE PIPE, YOU CALL THE TUNE: THE NET NEUTRALITY DEBATE AND ITS 
(IR)RELEVANCE FOR EUROPE 9-11 (2008), available at http://shop.ceps.eu/ 
downfree.php?item_id=1755; Craig McTaggart, Was the Internet Ever Neutral?, 34 RES. 
CONF. ON COMM’N, INFO. & INTERNET POL’Y 1, 4–14 (2006), available at 
http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2006/593/mctaggart-tprc06rev.pdf; David Clark, Written 
Statement to the En Banc Public Hearing on Broadband Network Management Practices 
(Feb. 25, 2008), available at http://www.fcc.gov/broadband_network_management/ 
022508/clark.pdf (“The Internet is not neutral and has not been for a long time.”). 
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Part I frames the subsequent developments by describing the 
architecture and business relationships that defined the early Internet. 
Part II analyzes the architectural changes that have made the Internet’s 
topology increasingly heterogeneous, including the emergence of 
multihoming, secondary peering, private networks, and content delivery 
networks. Part III describes the changes in ways that networks 
interconnect and price their services, focusing on the emergence of peer-
to-peer applications and pricing innovations that go beyond the 
traditional bipartite distinction between peering and transit. Far from 
representing some network provider’s efforts to promote its self interest 
at the expense of the public, as some network neutrality proponents have 
suggested, these changes have the potential to yield substantial benefits 
both to individual consumers and to society as a whole. 
I. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE EARLY INTERNET 
This Part reviews the architecture of the early Internet. Section A 
reviews the tripartite hierarchical structure that characterized its 
topology. Section B describes the peering and transit relationships that 
governed the way individual networks interconnected with one another. 
A. The Topology of the Early Internet 
When the Internet first emerged, its topology and the business 
relationships comprising it were relatively simple. As is widely known, 
the Internet evolved out of the NSFNET backbone, which was created 
in 1986 and eventually decommissioned in 1997 to provide universities 
all over the country access to federally funded supercomputing centers 
located in five universities. The primary architects of the NSFNET 
decided to give it a tripartite structure. At the top was the NSFNET 
backbone, which at its peak connected sixteen research facilities across 
the country. At the bottom were the campus networks run by individual 
universities. In the middle were regional networks (typically operated by 
university consortia or state-university partnerships) that linked the 
campus networks to the major computing centers.8 
 8. MERIT NETWORK, INC., NSFNET: A PARTNERSHIP FOR HIGH-SPEED 
NETWORKING, FINAL REPORT 1987–1995, at 11–12 (1996), available at 
http://www.merit.edu/documents/pdf/nsfnet/nsfnet_report.pdf; Juan D. Rogers, 
Internetworking and the Politics of Science: NSFNET in Internet History, 14 INFO. SOC’Y 213, 
219 (1998). 
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Every packet had to travel through a parallel path traversing each 
level of the hierarchy. For example, traffic originating on one campus 
network would have to connect to the regional network with which it 
was associated, which handed off the traffic to the NSFNET backbone, 
which in turn handed it off to the regional network that served the 
destination campus network. The result was to create a series of parallel 
hierarchies through which all traffic had to traverse. 
The network retained this same basic architecture when it was 
privatized during the mid-1990s. The NSFNET backbone at the top of 
the hierarchy was replaced by a series of private backbone providers that 
interconnected with one another at four public network access points 
(NAPs) established by the NSF. The campus networks at the bottom of 
the hierarchy were replaced by last-mile providers that transported traffic 
from local distribution facilities maintained in individual cities (which in 
the case of digital subscriber lines (DSL) is usually called a central office 
and in the case of cable modem systems is usually called a headend) to 
end users’ residences and places of business. The regional networks 
evolved into regional Internet service providers (ISPs) that transported 
traffic between the NAPs served by backbone providers and the central 
offices and headends maintained by last-mile providers. 
The privatization of the Internet did not change the hierarchical 
nature of the basic architecture. Each regional ISP still connected to a 
single backbone, and each last-mile provider still connected to a single 
regional ISP. Indeed, the early versions of the protocol employed by the 
backbones (known as border gateway protocol or BGP) would not 
Figure 1: The NSFNET Backbone circa 1992-1993
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B. Business Relationships on the Early Internet: Peering and Transit 
The early Internet was also characterized by relatively simple 
business relationships. End users typically purchased Internet access 
through some form of all-you-can-eat pricing, which allowed them to 
consume as much bandwidth as they would like for a single flat rate. 
Relationships between network providers typically fell into two 
categories. Tier-1 ISPs entered into peering relationships with one 
another, in which they exchanged traffic on a settlement-free basis and 
no money changed hands. The primary justification for foregoing 
payment is transaction costs. Although the backbones could meter and 
bill each other for the traffic they exchanged, they could avoid the cost of 
doing so without suffering any economic harm so long as the traffic they 
exchanged was roughly symmetrical. Such arrangements would not be 
economical with when the traffic being exchanged by the two networks 
was severely imbalanced. Thus tier-1 ISPs will not peer with other 
networks that are unable to maintain a minimum level of traffic volume. 
In addition, peering partners typically require that inbound and 
outbound traffic not exceed a certain ratio. Networks that cannot meet 
these requirements must enter into transit arrangements in which they 
pay the backbone to provide connectivity to the rest of the Internet.13 
Most early analyses focused on the financial terms of these 
arrangements.14 What is often overlooked is that interconnection 
agreements performed two distinct functions. Network providers enter 
into interconnection agreements not only to send and receive traffic. 
They also enter into interconnection agreements to announce to the rest 
of the Internet where the IP addresses that they control are located. 
Consider this from the perspective of a small network, A, which 
serves a small number of its own customers and purchases access to the 
rest of the Internet through another ISP. The transit agreement between 
A and the ISP would not only require the ISP to receive traffic sent by A 
and to deliver traffic bound to A. It would also require the ISP to 
announce to the rest of the Internet how to reach the IP prefixes 
associated with A’s customers. In addition, A can maintain a very simple 
routing table. It need only keep track of the prefixes of the customers 
that it serves. For all other IP addresses, A can enter a “default route” into 
its routing table that directs all other traffic to the other ISP. 
 13. Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 9, at 1877; Michael Kende, The Digital 
Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones 5 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy Working Paper 
No. 32, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp32.pdf; 
Peyman Faratin et al., The Growing Complexity of Internet Interconnection, 72 COMMC’NS & 
STRATEGIES 51, 55–56 (2008). 
 14. See, e.g., Kende, supra note 13, at 5. 
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significant policy implications that have largely been overlooked in the 
policy debate. 
A. Private Peering, Multihoming, and Secondary Peering 
One of the first problems to emerge in the early Internet was 
congestion in the NAPs, which often caused throughput times and 
network reliability to degrade. Some estimate that congestion in the 
NAPs caused packet loss at times to run as high as 40%.17 As the NAPs 
became increasingly congested, backbones began to find it advantageous 
to exchange traffic at private interconnection points.18 
In addition, regional ISPs have begun to connect to more than one 
backbone, a practice known as multihoming, in part to protect against 
service outages and in part to limit their vulnerability to any exertion of 
market power by a backbone.19 Regional ISPs that did not have sufficient 
volume to peer with the tier-1 backbones also began to find that they did 
have sufficient volume to peer with other regional ISPs, a practice known 
as secondary peering. Enabling regional ISPs to exchange traffic on a 
settlement-free basis reduced the costs borne by end users. In addition 
secondary peering would often shorten the number of hops needed for 
particular packets to reach their final destination and make them subject 
to bilateral (as opposed to multiparty) negotiations, both of which should 
increase networks’ control over quality of service.20 Secondary peering 
and multihoming also made the network more robust by creating 
multiple paths through which network nodes could interconnect. In fact, 
as much as seventy percent of the nodes in the Internet can now 
communicate with one another without passing through the public 
backbone.21 This had the additional benefit of weakening the market 
position of the top-tier backbones, since any breakdown in the business 
relationship would not necessarily disconnect the ISP from the network 
and the ability to route along different paths places a natural limit on the 
backbones’ ability to engage in supracompetitive pricing.22 
 17. See InterNAP Wakes Up Transmission Quality, RED HERRING, Apr. 21, 1999, 
http://redherring.com/Home/1744; see also Kende, supra note 13, at 6 (citing reports that 
packet loss in the NAP located in Washington, D.C., ran as high as 20%). 
 18. Kende, supra note 13, at 6–7; Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 62. 
 19. See Nicholas Economides, “Net Neutrality,” Non-Discrimination, and Digital 
Distribution of Content Through the Internet, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 209, 220 
(2008). 
 20. See OECD, WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 
SERVICES POLICIES, INTERNET TRAFFIC EXCHANGE: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND 
MEASUREMENT OF GROWTH 21–22 (2006), http://icttoolkit.infodev.org/en/ 
Publication.3081.html; Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 55–56. 
 21. See Shai Carmi et al., A Model of Internet Topology Using k-Shell Decomposition, 104 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11,150, 11,151 (2007). 
 22. See Besen et al., supra note 12, at 294–95. 
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with the lowest latency.23  
In addition, transit contracts call for customers to pay a flat fee up 
to a predetermined peak volume (known as the committed rate) and pay 
additional charges for any volume that exceeds that level. For the same 
reason that consumers with two mobile telephones have the incentive to 
use up all of the prepaid minutes on both lines before incurring any 
additional per-minute charges, multihomed entities have the incentive to 
utilize all of their committed rate before paying additional fees. This 
lowers overall transit cost, but requires diverting some traffic along a path 
that is longer than the one stored in the routing tables.24 For similar 
reasons, a network may intentionally route traffic over a more costly path 
if doing so will help it maintain its traffic within the ratios mandated by 
its peering contract.25 Again, the effect is to introduce significant 
variance in the speed with which similarly situated packets will arrive at 
their destination and the cost that similarly situated packets will have to 
bear. This variance results not from anticompetitive motives, but rather 
from networks’ attempts to minimize costs and ensure quality of service 
in the face of a network topology that is increasingly heterogeneous. 
B. Server Farms and Content Delivery Networks 
Large content providers have begun to employ other means to 
reduce cost and manage latency. One solution is to forego maintaining a 
single large server and instead to deploy multiple points of presence in 
carrier hotels across the country. Doing so allows these content providers 
to avoid paying transit charges to reach the public backbone and instead 
transmit their traffic through secondary peering arraignments with tier-2 
ISPs. Greater reliance on private networks also gives the content 
providers greater control over network security and performance.26 
Indeed, a recent study indicates that Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft have 
been able to use server farms to bypass the backbone altogether for 
roughly a third of their traffic and to keep their number of hops for 
traffic that had to pass through the backbone to no more than one or 
 23. Fanglu Guo et al., Experiences in Building a Multihoming Load Balancing System, 
IEEE INFOCOM CONF., 2004, available at http://www.ieee-infocom.org/2004/Papers/ 
26_4.PDF. 
 24. INTERNAP NETWORK SERVS. CORP., ECONOMICS OF MULTI-HOMING AND 
PREMISE-BASED OPTIMIZATION 10 (2008), available at http://internap.com/pdf/white-
papers/WP_FCP_Economics_of_MultiHoming_0208.pdf. 
 25. Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 64–65. 
 26. See Stephanie N. Mehta, Behold the Server Farm! Glorious Temple of the Information 
Age!, FORTUNE, Aug. 1, 2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ 
fortune_archive/2006/08/07/8382587/index.htm; R. Scott Raynovich, Google’s Own Private 
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content to their caches, they are best regarded as an overlay to the 
existing network. Increasingly, however, CDNs and server farms are 
bypassing the public backbone altogether and connecting to their caches 
through private networks, in the process transforming CDNs into a 
fundamentally different architecture.30 
All of these developments represent innovative solutions to adjust to 
the realities of the Internet. The differences in topology means that 
traffic that is otherwise similar may travel through the network at 
different speeds, with different costs, and with different levels of quality 
of service. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
The evolution of the Internet has not been restricted to topology. 
Network participants have also been experimenting with an increasingly 
broad range of business arrangements. As I discuss in Section A, some of 
these innovations have been driven by the increasing significance of peer-
to-peer technologies. Section B discusses the emergence of alternative 
business arrangements known as partial transit and paid peering. 
A. The Growing Importance of Peer-to-Peer Architectures 
One of the primary forces causing business relationships to change 
is the growing importance of applications using peer-to-peer 
technologies. The traditional Internet employed what is known as a 
client-server architecture, in which files are stored in large computers at 
centralized locations (servers) and end users (clients) request files from 
those computers. The relationship is generally regarded as hierarchical. 
In addition, the amount of data uploaded by clients is very small relative 
to the amount of data downloaded by servers. In the classic example of 
the World Wide Web, client traffic consists solely of uniform resource 
locators (URLs), the short bits of code identifying a particular website 
address. Server traffic, which consists of the data comprising the 
requested website, is much larger. For this reason, the technologies that 
took the early lead in broadband deployment (cable modem service and 
DSL) adapted an asymmetric architecture, allocating a larger proportion 
of the available bandwidth to downloading than to uploading. Newer 
technologies, such as fiber and wireless broadband, follow the same 
pattern.31 
Peer-to-peer technologies follow a very different approach. Edge 
computers in a peer-to-peer architecture are not divided into those that 
 30. See Dave Clark et al., Overlay Networks and the Future of the Internet, 63 COMMC’NS 
& STRATEGIES 109, 123–25 (2006). 
 31. Yoo, Consumers and Innovation, supra note 9, at 191. 
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host files and those that request files. Instead, computers simultaneously 
perform both functions. Because this relationship is regarded as less 
hierarchical than client-server relationships, the computers in this 
architecture are known as peers and communications between them are 
known as peer-to-peer. Peer-to-peer is thus not synonymous with file 
sharing or user-generated content, as is often mistakenly assumed. On 
the contrary, many peer-to-peer applications (such as Vuze) support 
commercial broadcast services, and many platforms for user-generated 
content (such as YouTube) employ centralized servers. The real 
significance of the term peer-to-peer lies in the nature of the network 
architecture. 
It is not yet clear what proportion of network traffic will follow each 
architecture. For example, peer-to-peer traffic had consistently 
outstripped client-server traffic for several years leading up to 2007. In 
2007, however, client-server traffic staged a comeback, thanks primarily 
to the expansion of streaming video services like YouTube, and exceeded 
peer-to-peer traffic 45% to 37%.32 Many industry observers now predict 
that although peer-to-peer will remain important, it will decline as a 
percentage of total Internet traffic over the next several years.33 Even so, 
it is clear that peer-to-peer traffic is likely to remain a more important 
component of network traffic than it was during the Internet’s early 
years. 
The growing importance of peer-to-peer technologies is causing 
significant congestion in certain areas of the network and is putting 
pressure on the traditional approach to pricing network services. The 
emergence of end users as important sources of data is putting severe 
pressure on the limited bandwidth allocated to upload traffic. In 
addition, unlike in a client-server architecture, where end users usually 
only generate traffic when a person is seated at the keyboard, edge 
computers in a peer-to-peer architecture can generate traffic for as long 
as the computer is left running. The result is that the lion’s share of 
upload traffic is generated by a small number of superheavy peer-to-peer 
users. As few as five percent of end users may be responsible for 
generating more than 50 percent of all Internet traffic.34 
 32. See Press Release, Ellacoya Networks, Inc, Ellacoya Data Shows Web Traffic 
Overtakes Peer-to-Peer (P2P) as Largest Percentage of Bandwidth on the Network (June 18, 
2007), (on file with the author), available at http://www.ellacoya.com/news/pdf/2007/ 
NXTcommEllacoyamediaalert.pdf. 
 33. CISCO SYS., INC., CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND 
METHODOLOGY 2008–2013, at 1–2, 5–6 (June 9, 2009), http://www.cisco.com/en/US/ 
solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-481360.pdf. 
 34. See Steven Levy, Pay per Gig, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2008, at D1; DAVID VORHAUS, 
YANKEE GROUP, CONFRONTING THE ALBATROSS OF P2P 1 (May 31, 2007); Comments 
of CTIA – The Wireless Association, in the Petition to Establish Rules Governing Network 
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Service can slow to a crawl if as few as fifteen of the five hundred or so 
users sharing the same node are using peer-to-peer applications to 
download files.35  
The classic economic solution to congestion is to set the price of 
incremental network usage equal to the congestion costs imposed on the 
network by that usage. However, determining the congestion cost 
imposed by any particular user at any particular time can be quite 
complex. Subscribers that use large amounts of bandwidth can contribute 
very little to network congestion if they confine their usage to hours 
when network usage is low. Conversely, a subscriber that only uses small 
amounts of bandwidth may nonetheless impose significant congestion 
costs on the network if they generate traffic at peak times. The 
contribution of any particular usage cannot be determined simply by 
counting the number of bits being transmitted. The overall impact of any 
particular increase in network usage can only be determined in light of 
other subscribers’ Internet usage.36 Thus it may make sense to charge 
different amounts to users who are using the Internet to access the same 
content or application if a sufficient number of other users sharing the 
same bandwidth are using the network at the same time. 
The growth of peer-to-peer technologies has also heightened the 
pressure on the models that network providers have used to price their 
services. As noted earlier, the traditional approach charges content and 
application providers prices that increase with the peak bandwidth 
consumed, while end users are charged on an unmetered, all-you-can-eat 
basis. The fact that every download had to pass through one link that 
charged on a volume-sensitive basis allowed this pricing approach to 
serve as a reasonable approximation of efficient congestion pricing. For 
example, one hundred downloads of a 700 megabyte movie would 
generate 70 gigabytes of traffic from the server, which in turn would be 
reflected in the price paid by the content provider to its ISP.  
The situation is quite different under peer-to-peer architecture. In 
that case, the movie could be downloaded once from the server, and the 
remaining ninety-nine downloads could be served by other end users 
running the same peer-to-peer software. Because end users are provided 
with service on an all-you-can-eat basis, the additional ninety-nine 
downloads served by the peer-to-peer network do not generate any 
additional revenue. The only revenue received by the network is for the 
 35. See James J. Martin & James M. Westall, Assessing the Impact of BitTorrent on 
DOCSIS Networks, IEEE BROADNETS, Sept. 2007, available at http://people.clemson.edu/ 
~jmarty/papers/bittorrentBroadnets.pdf; see also Leslie Ellis, BitTorrent’s Swarms Have a 
Deadly Bite on Broadband Nets, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 8, 2006, 
http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6332098.html. 
 36. Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 9, at 1868–69. 
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initial 700 megabyte download. Thus, in a peer-to-peer architecture, the 
amounts that content providers pay under the traditional pricing regime 
no longer serve as a workable approximation of the total traffic they 
impose on the network. Moreover, the failure to charge network 
participants prices that reflect their incremental contribution to 
congestion causes excessive consumption of network resources that 
ultimately harms consumers. 
It thus comes as no surprise that the network providers that are 
most subject to local congestion are experimenting with other means for 
managing the congestion caused by peer-to-peer applications. For 
example, Time Warner has recently experimented with bandwidth caps 
and other forms of metered pricing. Although many network neutrality 
proponents have no objection to metered pricing,37 recent attempts to 
impose metered pricing and bandwidth caps have met such a hostile 
reaction from the network neutrality community that the network 
providers had to back down.38 That said, metered pricing is far from a 
panacea. As I have discussed in greater detail, true congestion-based 
pricing would vary from moment to moment based on the volume of 
traffic introduced into the network by other users. Not only would such a 
pricing regime challenge consumers’ ability to process the relevant 
information; the distributed nature of the Internet means that no one 
entity has the information needed to formulate such policies. As a result, 
other network providers have turned to proxies that are strongly 
associated with high-volume activity, which most importantly includes a 
ban on operating a server as required by peer-to-peer technologies.39 
 37. Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & 
Transportation, 109th Cong 55, 58, 74 (2006) (statement of Prof. Lawrence Lessig), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg605/pdf/CHRG-109shrg605.pdf; Tim 
Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
141, 154 (2003). 
 38. For criticism of Time Warner’s January 2008 attempt to impose metered pricing, see 
Catherine Holahan, Time Warner’s Pricing Paradox: Proposed Changes in the Cable Provider’s 
Fees for Web Could Crimp Demand for Download Services and Hurt Net Innovation, BUS. WK., 
Jan. 18, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2008/ 
tc20080118_598544.htm; Posting of Marvin Ammori to Save the Internet, Time Warner 
Goes Back to the Future, http://www.savetheinternet.com/archive/2008/01/25/back-to-the-
future-time-warner-broadband-plan-recalls-aols-walled-garden/ (Jan. 25, 2008); Posting of 
Lynn Erskine to Save the Internet, Time Warner Metered Pricing: Not the Solution, 
http://www.savetheinternet.com/blog/2008/01/17/time-warner%e2%80%99s-metered-
pricing-not-the-solution/ (Jan. 17, 2008); Posting of Fred von Lohmann to DeepLinks, Time 
Warner Puts a Meter on the Internet, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/01/time-warners-
puts-meter-internet (Jan. 22, 2008). For criticism of Time Warner’s January 2009 attempt to 
impose bandwidth caps, see Press Release, Free Press, Free Press Wary of Internet Caps (Feb. 
4, 2009), http://www.freepress.net/node/47855; Press Release, Public Knowledge, Public 
Knowledge Statement on Time Warner Halt to Broadband Caps (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2100. 
 39. Yoo, Economics of Congestion, supra note 9, at 1871. 
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Although this would constitute a violation of network neutrality by 
discriminating against a particular type of application, even network 
neutrality proponents acknowledge that such a restriction represents a 
good proxy for bandwidth-intensive activity.40 
B. The Emergence of Partial Transit and Paid Peering 
Network providers have also begun to enter into business 
relationships that go beyond peering and transit relationships that 
dominated the early Internet. Some are driven by the emergence of 
secondary peering relationships discussed above.41 Before such 
relationships existed, a tier-2 or tier-3 ISP would have to buy transit 
from a tier-1 ISP that had obtained access to all of the IP addresses that 
it did not serve. In other words, a tier-2 or tier-3 ISP’s transit 
relationships would cover the entire Internet (except for its own 
customers). 
The advent of secondary peering reduces the scope of transit 
services that the ISP needs to purchase. In short, the ISP no longer needs 
to buy transit to the entire Internet. The secondary peering relationships 
already provide it with the ability to reach those customers served by its 
secondary peering partners. As a result, these ISPs have begun to 
purchase partial transit that covers less than the entire Internet (i.e., 
those portions of the Internet not already covered by its secondary 
peering relationships). In addition, an ISP with inbound traffic that far 
exceeds its outbound traffic may run the risk of having traffic ratios that 
put it in violation of its peering contract. Under these circumstances, it 
may attempt to cover its deficit in outbound traffic by selling partial 
transit contract that covers only outbound traffic, but not inbound traffic. 
Alternatively, it may reduce its inbound traffic by buying partial transit 
for inbound traffic.42 
Another interesting development is the emergence of paid peering.43 
Paid peering involves all of the same aspects as conventional peering 
relationships. Peers announce to the rest of the Internet the addresses 
that their peering partners control, maintain a sufficient number of 
interconnection points across the country, and maintain the requisite 
total volume and traffic ratios. The key difference is that one peering 
 40. Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics 
of the Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 409 (2007). 
 41. See supra Part II.A. 
 42. Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 60–61. 
 43. For earlier discussions, see Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality after Comcast: 
Toward a Case-by-Case Approach to Reasonable Network Management, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY: THE WAY FORWARD 55, 71–76 (Randolph J. May 
ed., 2009) [hereinafter Yoo, Toward a Case-by-Case Approach]; Yoo, Consumers and Innovation, 
supra note 9, at 222–27. 
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partner pays the other partner for its services. 
Paid peering is driven by both supply-side and demand-side 
considerations. Starting first with the supply side, settlement-free peering 
arrangements between tier-1 ISPs with similar traffic volumes make 
sense only if both networks have similar costs. Over time, backbones 
have begun to serve two different types of last-mile networks: those that 
primarily serve content and application providers (such as Cogent and 
Abovenet), which some commentators call “content networks,” and those 
that serve end users (such as Comcast and Verizon), which some 
commentators call “eyeball networks.”44 The costs of the first type of 
network (connecting content and application providers) are quite low, 
typically only requiring a single high-speed line to a small number of 
business locations. The costs of the second type of network (connecting 
end users) are considerably higher, requiring the wiring and upgrading of 
equipment in entire neighborhoods. The presence of such asymmetric 
costs provides a substantial impetus for cash to flow from networks 
serving content and application providers to networks providing 
connections to end users.45 
These supply-side considerations are reinforced by demand-side 
considerations associated with the economics of two-sided markets, 
which illustrates the potential benefits of allowing network providers to 
charge differential prices to both end users and content and application 
providers.46 Conventional economics has long recognized the existence of 
 44. See Faratin et al., supra note 13, at 58. 
 45. See id. at 58–59. 
































Figure 7: Paid Peering and the Economics of Two-Sided Markets
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“network economic effects,” which cause a network to increase in value as 
the number of users connected to it increases. To use a classic example, 
the value of a telephone network to a particular consumer depends on 
more than just the services provided and the price charged, as is the case 
with most goods. It also depends on the number of other subscribers 
connected to the network. The more people you can reach through the 
network, the more valuable it becomes. 
The benefits created by the network economic effect for telephone 
networks arise with respect to a single class of customers. When a market 
is two sided, instead of bringing together a single class of similarly 
situated users, networks bring together two completely different classes 
of users. In those cases, the value is determined not by the number of 
users of the same class, but rather the number of users of the other class. 
A classic example is broadcast television, which brings together two 
groups: viewers and advertisers. Advertisers gain no benefit (and if 
anything suffer a detriment) from belonging to a network with a large 
number of other advertisers. The value of the network for advertisers is 
instead determined solely by the number of viewers, i.e., the size of the 
other class of users. 
The literature suggests that social welfare would be maximized if 
the network provider were permitted to price discriminate on both sides 
of the two-sided market. It also suggests that the prices paid by those on 
each side of the market can differ widely and that in many cases, it is 
economically beneficial for one side to subsidize the other side of the 
market. The fact that the Internet has become increasingly dominated by 
advertising revenue paid to content and application providers suggest 
that it may be socially beneficial for content and application providers to 
subsidize the prices paid by end users. An advertiser’s willingness to pay 
for an ad on any particular website depends on the number of end users 
viewing that website. Under these circumstances, the optimal solution 
may be for the website owner to subsidize the total number of end users 
by making payments to the network provider to help defray their costs of 
connection. The costs of subsidizing more users would be more than 
offset by the additional revenue generated by the fact that advertisers can 
now reach more potential customers. In the case of broadband, this 
would be both economically efficient and would be a boon to consumers 
both in terms of providing service in more geographic areas and in 
reducing the prices that consumers pay.47 
These dynamics are again well illustrated by broadcast television.48 
In many ways, broadcast television and the Internet are analogous. The 
222–27. 
 47. See id. at 225–26. 
 48. See Yoo, Toward a Case-by-Case Approach, supra note 43, at 73–75. 
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movie studios that create television programs play a similar role to 
content and application providers. Television networks aggregate 
programs and deliver them nationally in much the same manner as 
content networks and backbone providers. Local broadcast stations 
provide last-mile connectivity that is quite similar to the role played by 
eyeball networks. In addition, the revenue structure is quite comparable, 
in that television networks receive advertising revenue in much the same 
manner as content and application providers. Furthermore, the cost 
structure is somewhat similar in that connecting individual homes is 
much more costly than distributing programming nationally. 
For decades, the standard business arrangement has been for 
television networks to subsidize the operations of local broadcast stations 
by paying them to be members of their television networks. The 
industry’s revenue and cost structure make such arrangements quite 
logical. The cost of paying these broadcast stations to affiliate with a 
network is more than offset by the increase in advertising revenue made 
possible by the fact that the network is now able to reach a larger 
audience. Broadcast television thus represents a prime example of when 
firms operating on one side of the market find it economically beneficial 
to subsidize end users on the other side of the market. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the affiliation fees that the networks 
pay to broadcast stations is anything but uniform. The precise amount 
varies with the relative strength of the network and the relative strength 
of the broadcast station. Stronger broadcast stations receive more, while 
weaker ones receive less. Equally interesting is the fact that in recent 
years, the cash flow has begun to vary in its direction as well as 
magnitude, with weaker stations having to pay rather than be paid to be 
part of the television network. The dynamic nature of this pricing regime 
benefits consumers by providing incentives for networks to invest in 
better quality programming and by providing an incentive for stations to 
provide better carriage. 
The two-sided market analysis reveals the potential drawbacks of 
preventing network providers from charging differential prices. As a 
general matter, pricing flexibility makes it easier for network providers to 
recover the costs of building additional bandwidth. Granting network 
providers pricing flexibility with respect to content and application 
providers should reduce the percentage of the network costs borne by 
consumers. Conversely, preventing network providers from exercising 
pricing flexibility with respect to content and application providers would 
simply increase the proportion of the network costs that providers must 
recover directly from end users. This simultaneously raises the prices paid 
by consumers and decreases the likelihood that the capital improvements 
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will ever be built.49 Charging content and application providers 
differential prices thus has the potential to increase social welfare and can 
reduce, not increase, the burden borne by consumers. 
CONCLUSION 
It is all too easy to forget that the Internet is not a monolith with a 
brooding omnipresence overseeing the entire system. Instead, it is a 
collection of autonomous systems that determines the terms of 
interconnection through a series of arms-length negotiations between 
individual networks. Given the Internet’s essence as a network of 
networks, it should come as no surprise that no two packets will pay the 
same amount for the same service. 
The developments that I have outlined in this article have made 
such differences even more likely. The network no longer adheres to the 
rigid and uniform hierarchy that characterized the early Internet and its 
predecessor, the NSFNET. Packets can now travel along radically 
different paths based on the topology of the portion of the network 
through which they travel. This is the inevitable result of reducing costs 
and experimenting with new structures. At the same time that network 
providers are experimenting with new topologies, they are also 
experimenting with new business relationships. Gone are the days when 
networks interconnected through peering and transit and imposed all-
you-can eat pricing on all end users. That fairly simple and uniform set 
of contractual arrangements has been replaced by a much more complex 
set of business relationships that reflect creative solutions to an 
increasingly complex set of economic problems. Again, these differences 
mean that the service that any particular packet receives and the amount 
that it pays will vary with the business relationships between the 
networks through which it travels. Although many observers reflexively 
view such deviations from the status quo with suspicion, in many (if not 
most) cases, they represent nothing more than the natural evolution of a 
network trying to respond to an ever-growing diversity of customer 
demands. Imposing regulation that would thwart such developments 
threaten to increase costs and discourage investment in ways that 
ultimately work to the detriment of the consumers that such regulation is 
ostensibly designed to protect. 
 
 49. See Wall Street’s Perspective on Telecommunications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 13–16 (2006) (testimony of Craig E. 
Moffett, Vice President and Senior Analyst, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg589/pdf/CHRG-109shrg589.pdf. 
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